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Emerson and Skepticism
A Reading of “Friendship”
Russell B. Goodman
1 My consideration of Emerson’s “Friendship” essay is part of a broader project of trying to
make sense of Emerson’s thought as a whole by delineating paths of coherence through it.
These paths fall into two kinds: the consistent enunciation of a view or “master-tone”
from essay to essay, and the internal linkage among these views.1 For example, the notion
of process or flux finds its way into all  Emerson’s essays,  and plays a central role in
several of his greatest. Process is more than a subject for continuing discussion in various
essays, however, for it is internally linked to many of Emerson’s most important claims:
that we must learn to skate over the surfaces of life, that all ethical forms are “initial,”
that language is most effectively used for “conveyance” rather than for “homestead,”
that “all things good are on the highway.”
2 While thinking about these paths of coherence among Emerson’s essays, I have at the
same time been attending to the ways Emerson’s individual essays work: to their order,
progression, argument, points of view.2 In this paper, I want to consider the “Friendship”
essay in all these ways: to chart the course of its argument, to delineate its connections
with other writings of Emerson’s, and to explore the conceptual connections between
friendship and such other Emersonian concepts as self-reliance.
3 I begin not with the “Friendship” essay itself, but with strands of Emerson’s discussion of
friendship that we find in some of his other essays. In “Spiritual Laws,” a companion
essay to “Friendship” in the Essays,  First Series,  Emerson describes the way friendships
begin. They have nothing to do with effort, worldly accomplishments, or physical beauty,
he asserts, but are rather matters of attraction or affinity. When “all is done,” Emerson
writes, “a person of related mind, a brother or sister by nature, comes to us so softly and
easily, so nearly and intimately, as if it were the blood in our proper veins, that we feel as
if  some one was  gone,  instead of  another  having come:  we are  utterly  relieved and
refreshed: it is a sort of joyful solitude” (CW2: 87).3 Friendships, like much of the best in
life as Emerson sees it, are spontaneous and unforced. 
4 Friendship appears in a rather different context in “The Divinity School Address,” where
Emerson complains that Christianity has lost the essential friendliness of Jesus’s message,
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so that “the friend of man is made the injurer of man.” The language “that describes
Christ to Europe and America,” Emerson complains,
is not the style of  friendship and enthusiasm to a good and noble heart,  but is
appropriated and formal, – paints a demigod, as the Orientals or the Greeks would
describe Osiris or Apollo […]. The time is coming when all men will see, that the gift
of God to the soul is not a vaunting, overpowering, excluding sanctity, but a sweet,
natural goodness, a goodness like thine and mine, and that so invites thine and
mine to be and to grow. (CW1: 82-3)
5 Jesus is the divine friend of divine men and women, Emerson holds. He is a god who is not
foreign but right at hand – as close as our friends in our best moments together, when we
are invited “to be and to grow.” The friendly message of Jesus, Emerson is saying, has
been usurped, or as we would now say, hijacked – transformed into a message of fear,
alienation, and hostility.
6 If friendship is central to Emerson’s conception of Christianity, it is equally central to his
conception of art, specifically to painting. Describing his first experiences with the great
paintings of Europe in the essay “Art,” Emerson writes that he “fancied the great pictures
would be great strangers; some surprising combination of color and form; a foreign won-
der.” Instead, he found the paintings “famililar and sincere, […] the plain you and me I
knew so  well,  –  had  left  at  home  in  so  many  conversations”  (CW2:  214).  He  found
Raphael’s Transfiguration, in particular, was “familiar […] as if one should meet a friend”
(CW2: 215).
7 But Emerson strikes another note here in “Art” that will  be crucial to my reading of
“Friendship”  –  for  it  is  a  skeptical  note.  Continuing  the  argument  we  have  been
examining,  he  takes  one  of  his  characteristic  dialectical  turns,  signaled  by  a  new
paragraph beginning with the word “yet”:
Yet when we have said all our fine things about the arts, we must end with a frank
confession, that the arts, as we know them, are but initial. Our best praise is given
to what they aimed at and promised, not to the actual result.  He has conceived
meanly of the resources of man, who believes that the best age of production is
past. The real value of the Iliad, or the Transfiguration, is as signs of power; billows
or ripples they are of the stream of tendency; tokens of the everlasting effort to
produce […]. There is higher work for Art than the arts. They are abortive births of
an imperfect or vitiated instinct. (CW2: 215)
8 Emerson’s terms for the arts he has experienced are derogatory:  they are said to be
“abortive births,” and to give only a “mean” idea of human resources and creativity. Yet
Emerson also asserts their value as “signs of power,” as inspirations or reminders of
something “aimed at and promised.” He turns against the great European painting that
he has just praised because of its distance from the ideal, just as he turns from even the
best books when he has his own work to do. In a similar manner and for similar reasons,
he turns from his friends.
9 The final essay I wish to cite before considering “Friendship” is “Experience,” a complex
assessment  of  human  life  in  the  context  of  the  death  of  Emerson’s  son  Waldo.
“Experience” presents what Cavell has called an “epistemology of moods,”4 according to
which life is a succession of different and sometimes irreconcilable perspectives on or
appreciations of things. In the passage I wish to consider, Emerson considers the different
books with which he has had intense relationships:
Once I took such delight in Montaigne that I thought I should not need any other
book; before that, in Shakespeare; then in Plutarch; then in Plotinus; at one time in
Bacon; afterwards in Goethe; even in Bettine; but now I turn the pages of either of
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them languidly, whilst I still cherish their genius. So with pictures; each will bear an
emphasis of attention once, which it cannot retain, though we fain would continue
to be pleased in that manner. How strongly I have felt of pictures, that when you
have seen one well, you must take your leave of it; you shall never see it again […].
The reason of the pain this discovery causes us (and we make it late in respect to
works of art and intellect), is the plaint of tragedy which murmurs from it in regard
to persons, to friendship and love. (CW3: 33)
10 This passage from “Experience” brings friendship into alignment with a tragic theme in
Emerson’s thought that is often overlooked. Although we may still “cherish the genius” of
the books and people we are no longer in touch with, Emerson is saying that we lose
some- thing too – and that this loss is both painful and inescapable, hence tragic. We must
take our leave of pictures, we must take our leave of friends, we must take our leave of
books.  These things that  ”you shall  never see […]  again” are the flip side – the less
pleasant  face –  of  the surprises  and flashing insights  that  Emerson characteristically
seeks and records.
11 Emerson’s idea that our human lives with others are disappointing chimes with Stanley
Cavell’s discussion of lived skepticism in The Claim of Reason. Our skepticism about others,
Cavell asserts, is not an academic exercise, but as common as the jealousy of Othello, the
blindness of Lear, the disappointment we feel with a conversation in which we have not
expressed ourselves adequately.  Cavell  conceives of such lived skepticism not only as
being  unsure  of  others  (as  Othello  is  of  Desdemona),  but  as  rooted  in  a  deep
disappointment with even our best cases of knowing – as if, he writes, “we have, or have
lost, some picture of what knowing another, or being known by another, would really
come – a harmony, a concord, a union, a transparence, a governance, a power – against
which our actual successes at knowing, and being known, are poor things.”5
12 Emerson’s critique is not directed at our best cases of friendship, whose satisfaction and
promise he credits, but at friendships that fail to deliver on their initial promise. When he
is in a glum mood about his life with his friends, he will say, as he does in one of the
darker  moments  of  the  essay  to  which  we  will  shortly  turn:  “Friendship,  like  the
immortality of the soul, is too good to be believed” (CW2: 116). Emerson doesn’t quite
believe in his friends (he neither names nor refers to a particular friend in his essay), but
he seeks and for some hours has found friendship. Cavell’s work on “skepticism about
other minds,” centers on the question of our own responsibility – Lear’s responsibility,
Othello’s responsibility – for failing to know others. Emerson’s focus is different, not on
our failures to acknowledge others but our failures to ask the best of both others and
ourselves. I take from Cavell both the idea that skepticism is lived out in our lives with
others, and a set of questions: whether skepticism is inescapable and whether it reveals
something about our condition; whether it is to be accommodated, yielded to, overcome,
or refuted. To put my cards on the table, I think Emerson shows us that a kind of lived
skepticism concerning others is a feature of our lives, but that the accomplishments of
friendship are too; and that in its powerful effect on us, friendship instills the hope for
something better than the best friend we have.
13 Emerson’s essay on “Friendship” begins in an unexpected place: with people “whom we
scarcely speak to,” or whom we merely “see in the street.” We “warmly rejoice to be
with” them, Emerson asserts. But what kind of being with is this? Emerson seems to be
talking about a sense of human community and even love, which we feel even when there
is no sign that it is reciprocated. No particular friend or relationship is singled out in
Emerson’s statement that the “whole human family is bathed with an element of love like
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a fine ether” (113). The tone is sanguine, but the reader is left to wonder where in this
picture is the friendship of one person for another.6
14 The  second  paragraph  continues  with  the  idea  of  a  generalized  feeling  of  love  and
companionship, what Emerson calls “emotions of benevolence and complacency which
are felt towards others.” There is a hierarchy of such emotions, he now asserts, from “the
lowest  degree  of  good  will,”  which  seems  to  be  Emerson’s  subject  in  these  opening
paragraphs, to “the highest degree of passionate love” (CW2: 113) – something he never
quite manages to discuss in the essay.
15 In the third paragraph Emerson moves from these somewhat abstract and generalized
remarks to a specific type of experience: our anticipation of the arrival in our house of a
“commended stranger.” What is this “stranger” doing in an essay on “Friendship?” one
might ask.  The stranger seems to stand for the possibilities of  an ideal  friendship,  a
friendship that we seek but do not have. In this way the commended stranger “stands for
humanity,” as Emerson puts it. Emerson asserts of the stranger that “He is what we wish”
(CW2: 114), implying that we seek the stranger’s company because he will give or inspire
in us something we now lack, what he calls in “History” our “unattained but attainable
self” (CW2: 5). Continuing his generic story of the arrival of the stranger, Emerson writes
that the “house is dusted” and among its residents the stranger’s “arrival almost brings
fear to the good hearts that would welcome him” (CW2: 113). After all the preparation
and anticipation the stranger’s visit at first goes very well. We speak better than we are
accustomed to, so that “our own kinsfolk and acquaintance […] feel a lively surprise at
our unusual powers.” However, as the visit continues, the stranger turns out to be not as
commendable as we had supposed, and the friend we had sought something still to be
wished for. For the stranger begins “to intrude his partialities, his definitions, his defects,
into the conversation,” and then:
it is all over. He has heard the first, the last and the best, he will ever hear from us
[…]. Vulgarity, ignorance, misapprehension, are old acquaintances. Now, when he
comes, he may get the order, the dress, and the dinner, – but the throbbing of the
heart, and the communications of the soul, no more. (CW2: 114)
16 What does this have to say about friendship? Not much, it might seem. There is no friend
here, but mostly vulgar “old acquaintances” who don’t show us the best of themselves
and who do not elicit the best in us. It is this normal condition that we had hoped to
escape and for a while did escape, with the commended stranger. The stranger awakens
our always present desire for “the throbbing of the heart and the communications of the
soul,” for a humanity of the future. But he also disappoints us.
17 Emerson’s little drama is a paradigm of lived skepticism in the following sense: it shows
that  our  doubts  about  friendship  are  justified  by  the  course  of  our  experience.  The
stranger’s arrival excites us with the hope of genius – his and ours – and he seems for
some moments to be the ideal we seek. Emerson generalizes the point in “Experience” not
just to commended strangers but to our friends. Our friends, he writes, “appear to us as
representatives of certain ideas” (CW3: 251), but there is “an optical illusion” about them.
Each  turns  out  to  have  boundaries  that  are  never  passed,  so  that  what  seemed
spontaneous and lively “in the year, in the lifetime, […] turns out to be a certain uniform
tune which the  revolving barrel  of  the  music-box must  play”  (CW3:  249).  Emerson’s
“Friendship”  essay  is  a  meditation  or  set  of  variations  on  this  theme  of  hope  and
disappointment in our lives with others. His initial drama includes several moods: the
“throbbing heart” of anticipation, and the “fear” of the meeting with the stranger, the
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expansive elation in the beginnings of conversation when our own powers surprise those
who know us,  the mood of disappointment and resignation as we return from elated
conversation  to  become  once  again  the  “dumb  devil”  who  greets  tedious  old
acquaintances. If, as Emerson says in “Experience,” our life is “a train of moods like a
string of beads” each showing “only what lies in its focus,” then Emerson’s friendship
essay records the moods of our lives with others.
18 Let us return now to the course of Emerson’s essay.  As if  beginning afresh,  Emerson
moves in paragraphs four and five to a discussion of the pleasures and advantages of
friendship, which he now describes as “an encounter of two, in a thought, in a feeling”
(CW2:  114).  Yet  amidst  this  praise  for  the  overcoming  of  the  boundaries  between
individuals  comes  the  suggestion  that  those  boundaries  remain:  “I  chide  society,  I
embrace solitude, and yet I am not so ungrateful as not to see the wise, the lovely, and the
noble-minded as from time to time they pass my gate.” This is an image of friendship, or
perhaps just admiration, at a distance, and recalls the opening paragraph’s cool pleasure
in the people to whom one does not speak.
19 The sixth paragraph returns to the impending visit of a stranger, but now (as if in a new
key) in the first person singular rather than the first person plural. “A new person is to
me a great event,” Emerson confesses, “and hinders me from sleep.” Again he strikes a
skeptical  note:  “I  have  often  had  fine  fancies  about  persons  which  have  given  me
delicious hours; but the joy ends in the day: it yields no fruit” (CW2: 115). Here it is not a
disappointment  with our criteria  as  such that  is  at  issue,  but  a  disappointment that
reasonable criteria of friendship – which have been met in our best moments with our
friends – are not met by this new visitor. Emerson oscillates between an appreciation of
and skepticism about his friend: “I must feel pride in my friend’s accomplishments as if
they were mine,” he states;  but also: “We overestimate the conscience of our friend”
(CW2: 115). Do we idolize our friends and they us, or do we accurately read each other’s
reality and promise?
20 Emerson begins the lengthy seventh paragraph with a series of skeptical observations and
conclusions about belief and knowledge:
Friendship, like the immortality of the soul, is too good to be believed. The lover,
beholding his maiden, half knows that she is not verily that which he worships; and
in the golden hour of  friendship we are surprised with shades of  suspicion and
unbelief. (CW2: 116)
21 In  Emerson’s  other  essays,  surprises  bring  joy  and  expansion,  a  new  and  fuller
perspective on life. Here however, we are surprised to find that our friend is more limited
than we thought, that we project virtues onto her that are not really there. Rather than
an underlying, living unity, Emerson now holds up “an Egyptian skull at our banquet” –
“an infinite remoteness” between persons.
22 From that remoteness Emerson turns to himself, to the self-reliant thought that a “man
who stands united with his thought conceives magnificently of himself.” Even if I do not
fully feel my own wealth, he adds, “I cannot choose but rely on my own poverty, more
than on your wealth.” The friend, he continues, is not “Being,” not “my soul,” but only “a
picture or effigy.” And this brings Emerson to a thought that he elaborates throughout
the essay: that our friends are for us to grow with and use, rather than components of a
stable, unchanging relationship. The soul “puts forth friends,” he writes, “as the tree puts
forth leaves, and presently, by the germination of new buds, extrudes the old leaf” (CW2:
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116). Our friends, the metaphor says, are forms of our growth, but they are not essential
to us. They are abandoned for new friends, new shoots and leaves.
23 The soul’s growth, as Emerson sees it, is an alternation between states of society and
solitude, each of which induces the opposite. “The soul environs itself with friends,” he
continues,
that it may into a grander self-acquaintance or solitude; and it goes alone, for a
season,  that  it  may exalt  its  conversation or society.  This  method betrays itself
along the whole history of our personal relations. The instinct of affection revives
the hope of union with our mates, and the returning sense of insulation recalls us
from the chase. Thus every man passes his life in the search after friendship […].
(CW2: 117)
24 Emerson’s “instinct of affection” takes the form of a sample letter he writes to each new
candidate for his friendship. The letter is couched in terms of certainty and doubt: the
letter writer is not “sure” of his friend, cannot “presume in thee a perfect intelligence of
me,” but acknowledges that the desire for knowledge of and by the friend is “a delicious
torment.”
25 If Emerson turns against an easy acceptance of what passes for friendship, he also begins
to turn against skepticism about friendship at the beginning of the ninth paragraph, a
turn again announced by the word “yet”: “Yet these uneasy pleasures and fine pains are
for curiosity and not for life. They are not to be indulged.” Life, Emerson is saying, offers
us  possibilities,  glimpses,  and  hours  of  something  better,  and  our  doubts  and
disappointments should not deflect us from pursuing and appreciating them. We should
not aim at “a swift and petty benefit” from our friends, but have the patience to allow
them to  be  themselves.  But  after  this  pragmatic  counsel  of  patience,  the  paragraph
gravitates away from the possibilities of friendship back to a dire portrayal of society:
Almost all people descend to meet. All association must be a compromise, and, what
is worst, the very flower and aroma of the flower of each of the beautiful natures
disappears as they approach each other. What a perpetual disappointment is actual
society, even of the virtuous and gifted! (CW2: 117)
26 But as if  paragraph nine introduces a theme that is then taken up more strongly in
paragraphs eleven and twelve, Emerson now turns toward the claim that ideal friendship
is also “real,” something found, however impermanently, in our experience. “I do not
wish to treat friendships daintily,” Emerson states, “but with roughest courage. When
[friendships] are real, they are not glass threads or frostwork, but the solidest thing we
know” (CW2: 118-9). Skepticism recedes as Emerson advances the epistemological claim
that we know our friends, at least as well as anything else we know. Reprising themes of
his opening paragraph, he speaks of the “sweet sincerity of joy and peace, which I draw
from this alliance with my brother’s soul […]. Happy is the house that shelters a friend!”
27 Midway in the immense thirteenth paragraph, Emerson develops a conceptual analysis of
friendship, as composed of Truth or Sincerity on the one hand, and Tenderness on the
other (CW2: 120). Sincerity is a noble virtue, a “luxury,” he states, “allowed, like diadems
and authority, only to the highest rank, that being permitted to speak truth, as having
none above it to court or conform unto” (CW2: 119). Sincerity resembles the straight talk
and  honest  judgments  of  the  “nonchalant  boys,  […]  sure  of  their  dinner”  in  “Self-
Reliance,” who “would disdain as much as a lord to do or say aught to conciliate one”
(CW 2: 29).
Emerson and Skepticism
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, II-2 | 2010
6
28 Emerson writes in “Self-Reliance” that “we are afraid of truth, afraid of fortune, afraid of
death, and afraid of each other” (CW2: 43). In the “Friendship” essay this fear is depicted
as insincerity: “We parry and fend the approach of our fellow man by compliments, by
gossip, by amusements, by affairs” (CW 2: 119). For their part, our fellow men and women
avoid the little we have to say or give by requiring that we humor them: each person,
Emerson complains, “has some fame, some talent, some whim of religion or philanthropy
in his head that is not to be questioned, and which spoils all conversation with him” (CW
2: 120).
29 With a real friend, in contrast, one may be perfectly sincere, as one is with oneself. The
friend is thus “a sort of paradox in nature,” Emerson argues, because although a) “every
man alone is sincere,” and b) “at the entrance of a second person, hypocrisy begins,” c)
the true friend is an other with whom I may be as sincere as I am with myself. Emerson
gives this paradox a metaphysical slant, and recalls the “idealism” that runs as a leitmotiv
through his writing, as he ends the paragraph. He states:
I who alone am, I who see nothing in nature whose existence I can affirm with equal
evidence to my own, behold now the semblance of my being in all its height, variety
and curiosity, reiterated in a foreign form; so that a friend may well be reckoned
the masterpiece of nature. (CW2: 120)
30 This is one of many moments in Emerson’s texts where along with his confrontation of an
essential self, he also finds an other – sometimes in nature, sometimes in the words of a
poet, sometimes, as here, in a friend. The setting of the encounter with the ideal friend is
one of pleasure and spectacle. As Emerson puts it in one of his seeming knockoff lines:
“My friend gives me entertainment without requiring any stipulation on my part” (CW2:
120).
31 Emerson  has  distinguished  two  elements  of  friendship:  sincerity  and  tenderness.  In
paragraph fourteen, he addresses tenderness, beginning with the tender anxiety we feel
in the face of another person to whom we are drawn: “we can scarce believe that so much
character can subsist in another as to draw us by love.” But he undercuts this tenderness
when he states: “I […] tender myself least to him to whom I am the most devoted” (CW2:
120). The lesson seems to be: devotion yes, tenderness not so much. Emerson’s critique
(but not abandonment) of tenderness relies on the previous paragraph’s discussion of
sincerity  and  self-reliance.  An  excess  of  tenderness  or  a  false  idea  of  tenderness  –
humoring someone,  or  following someone’s  stipulations –  is  the death of  friendship,
precisely because it conflicts with following one’s own path.
32 Emerson thus sketches a reformed tenderness, blending “the municipal virtues of justice,
punctuality, fidelity and pity” with a dose of the extraordinary or new. Friendship is to
“dignify  to  each other  the daily  needs  and offices” of  our  lives,  but  it  should avoid
degenerating into “something usual and settled.” Friends “should be alert and inventive”
(CW2: 121).7
33 In paragraphs fifteen and sixteen Emerson discusses numbers: can more than two persons
achieve the high conversation that is the form friendship often takes? What he calls the
“law of one to one” is essential for “conversation,” and conversation is “the practice and
consummation of friendship.” The presence of two people is necessary for friendship, but
not sufficient, for conversation is a matter of “affinity,” not of will. A man reputed to be a
great conversationalist, Emerson explains, does not therefore necessarily have “a word
[for] his cousin or uncle” (CW2: 122).
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34 The  argument  begun  in paragraph  thirteen,  concerning  truth,  tenderness,  and  the
encounter  with  one’s  majestic  semblance,  is  interwoven  with  themes  of  distance,
reception, patience, and self-reliance. Emerson rewrites a lesson of “The Divinity School
Address,” where he advises the graduates not to be “too anxious to visit periodically all
families and each family in your parish,” but to make their occasional visits count: “when
you meet one of  these men or women, be to them a divine man;  […] let  their timid
aspirations find in you a friend; let their trampled instincts be genially tempted out in
your atmosphere; […]” (CW1: 90). Now in “Friendship” Emerson writes that we should not
“desecrate noble and beautiful souls by intruding on them.” The friend is great enough to
be revered, but reverence requires distance. “Treat your friend as a spectacle,” Emerson
advises. “Of course he has merits that are not yours, and that you cannot honor, if you
must needs hold him close to your person. Stand aside; give those merits room; let them
mount and expand” (CW2: 123). The closeness of friendship requires a certain distance.
This closeness is not physical:  “You shall  not come nearer a man by getting into his
house.” It is a matter not of will but of what Emerson calls “the uprise of nature in us to
the same degree it is in them: then shall we meet as water with water […]” (CW2: 123-4).
35 Emerson writes in “Self-Reliance”: “do your work and I shall know you.” The condition of
being known is to do your own work. Friends have more than just knowledge of each
other, for they constitute a unity. All this is being said in “Friendship” when Emerson
writes: “There must be very two, before there can be very one. Let it be an alliance of two
large formidable natures, mutually beheld, mutually feared, before yet they recognize the
deep identity which beneath these disparities unites them” (CW 2:123).
36 In “The Divinity School Address” Emerson contrasts the friendly message of Jesus with
the fearful message of the church. Here the friend inspires awe and even fear. Fear of
what? Not divine punishment from a wrathful god, but condescension as she rises to new
heights.8 Friends are equals who spur each other to greater efforts, and greater deeds.
Readers of Nietzsche will find anticipations of Thus Spoke Zarathustra’s chapter “On the
Friend” in the passage from “Friendship” just quoted, and in Emerson’s continuation,
which goes as follows:
That great defying eye, that scornful beauty of his mien and action, do not pique
yourself  on  reducing,  but  rather  fortify  and  enhance  […].  Guard  him  as  thy
counterpart.  Let  him be to  thee forever  a  sort  of  beautiful  enemy,  untameable,
devoutly revered, and not a trivial conveniency to be soon outgrown and cast aside.
(CW 2:123-4)
37 One turns from the friend who no longer does us any good, but not from the friend with
whom we beautifully contends. We want to enhance and preserve the friend as beautiful
enemy. This friend is to be with us “forever.”
38 In a remarkably similar passage in in Zarathustra, Nietzsche writes:
In  a  friend  one  should  still  honor  the  enemy.  Can  you  go close  to  your  friend
without going over to him?
In a friend one should have one’s best enemy. You should be closest to him with
your heart when you resist him. […]
Are you pure air and solitude and bread and medicine for your friend? […]
Are you a slave? Then you cannot be a friend. Are you a tyrant? Then you cannot
have friends.9
39 Nietzsche’s tyrant corresponds to Emerson’s overly tender or solicitous “friend,” who
wants us to humor him. We who humor him are his slaves. Friends for both Nietzsche and
Emerson preserve and enhance both their own freedom and power and that of their
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friend. As Emerson puts it in the last sentence of his essay, friendship “treats its object as
a god, that it may deify both.”
40 Emerson’s  essay  progresses  from  a  diffuse  friendship  at  a  distance,  to  our
disappointments with our friends, to the reality of friendship in our lives and its promise
of something better than any friendship we have yet achieved. The essay concludes with
the repeated warning that much of what we accept as friendship is not the real thing. The
concluding tone is set in paragraph twenty-two, which opens in a slightly world-weary
fashion:  “The  higher  the  style  we  demand  of  friendship,  of  course  the  less  easy  to
establish it with flesh and blood. We walk alone in the world. Friends, such as we desire,
are dreams and fables” (CW 2: 125).
41 In our impatience for companionship, Emerson goes on to say, we settle for friendship of
a lower type: for “rash and foolish alliances,” “false relations,” and “leagues of friendship
with  cheap  persons”  (CW  2:125).  Reprising  the  themes  of  affinity  and  patience,  he
counsels his readers not to reach for others who do not belong to them by nature, but to
persist in their own paths. Not by will, but only by the attraction of their character will
they be able to “draw” to themselves “the first-born of the world.”
42 Echoing earlier passages about the virtue of domestic poverty versus the allure of foreign
wealth, Emerson now states:
We go to Europe, or we pursue persons, or we read books in the instinctive faith
that these will call it out and reveal us to ourselves. Beggars all. The persons are such
as we; the Europe, an old faded garment of dead persons; the books, their ghosts.
Let us drop this idolatry.  Let us give over this mendicancy. Let us even bid our
dearest friends farewell, and defy them, saying, ‘Who are you? Unhand me: I will be
dependent no more.’ (125-6; my italics)
43 We beg, when we should look at home for what we need. Those from whom we beg are
also beggars. Emerson calls our begging practice “idolatry.” We mistake another beggar
for a god. Idols are made of stone, whereas divinity lies in the power of thought and
transition, in, for example, the conversations and confrontations of great friends.
44 In the essay’s penultimate paragraph, Emerson confesses that in his “languid moods” he
fails to follow the advice he has given. He occupies himself with “foreign objects” rather
than his own development, and settles for the “household joy” and “warm sympathies”
that constitute so much of what ordinarily passes for friendship. Yet he also testifies to
his turnings from such friendships, a policy of aversion that runs parallel to the relation
to books he recommends in “The American Scholar.” For while books are a great part of
the scholar’s education, their true purpose is to inspire the scholar’s own thought. This is
why “books are for the scholar’s idle times” (CW 1: 57). It is not that when you are reading
you are not doing anything, but that reading is secondary to your own life. As with books,
so with friends:
I do then with my friends as I do with my books. I would have them where I can find
them, but I seldom use them. […] I cannot afford to speak much with my friend. If
he is great, he makes me so great that I cannot descend to converse. In the great
days, presentiments hover before me in the firmament. […] Then, though I prize my
friends, I cannot afford to talk with them and study their visions, lest I lose my own.
(CW 2:126)
45 As the “Friendship” essay comes to its end, the themes of self-reliance and an extreme if
benign  separation  from  others  come  to  the  fore.  Emerson  ends  the  penultimate
paragraph with the thought that he will meet with his friends “as though we met not, and
part as though we parted not.” He returns to the idea of friendship at a distance in the
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essay’s final paragraph: “It has seemed to me lately more possible than I knew, to carry a
friendship  greatly  on  one  side,  without  due  correspondence  on  the  other.”  But  he
immediately undercuts the alleged advantages or virtues of such a friendship when he
states: “Yet these things may hardly be said without a sort of treachery to the relation.
The essence of friendship is entireness, a total magnanimity and trust” (127). Where does
this leave us?
46 Looking back on the  “Friendship”  essay,  we can see  that  Emerson offers  a  range of
experiences  that  constitute  friendship:  titanic  battles  between  beautiful  enemies,
conversational brilliance and expansion, a joyful solitude, as if someone has departed
rather than arrived, a generalized benevolence toward people in the street to whom one
does not speak, the warm sympathies and household joy one shares with a familiar friend,
the disappointment of a friend outgrown. The gift of our best friends, Emerson holds, like
the gifts of art or literature, is a sense of our own power and prospects.
47 If I were to register any criticism of Emerson’s essay it would be for something he leaves
out, namely the death of a friend. No doubt I am particularly sensitive to the issue, as I
have lost a dear friend in the past year. It is not as if Emerson knew nothing of such loss,
for by the time he published Nature in 1836, he had lost his wife Ellen and his younger
brother, Charles. Indeed he brings up the subject of a friend’s death in the plaintive and
somewhat  abrupt  end  to  the  first  chapter  of  Nature.  After  praising  nature  for  her
comforts, and recording an ecstatic experience “in snow puddles, at twilight,” Emerson
ends the chapter as follows:
Nature always wears the colors of the spirit. To a man laboring under a calamity,
the heat of his own fire hath sadness in it. Then, there is a kind of contempt of the
landscape felt by him who has just lost by death a dear friend. The sky is less grand
as it shuts down over less worth in the population. (CW 1: 10-1)
48 Here the world as a whole loses significance: we are in the domain of what Wittgenstein
calls the “world” of “the unhappy man.”10
49 There is another form the loss of a friend takes in our lives, in which it is not the world as
a whole that loses its worth or significance,  but a part of oneself  that is threatened.
Emerson sets us in the right direction for appreciating this  point when he writes in
“Spiritual Laws”: “That mood into which a friend can bring us is his dominion over us”
(CW 2:84). The word “dominion” means control or lordship, and also the lands or domains
of a lord. Putting these senses together we can understand Emerson as saying that our
friend allows us to live in a domain that we enter only in the mood into which he can
bring us. Now when the friend dies, the mood into which he can bring us, the domain in
which we lived together under his authority, dies with him. I think of this as a shrinkage
of the self, a loss of that part of us that shows itself only with this friend.11 Emerson
suggests a different view in “Experience” when he considers the loss of his child and
finds, to his surprise and dismay, not a loss of self but a self still intact, though unable to
absorb or process the events of its life.
50 Emerson’s skepticism about friendship is part of his critique of the lower, conforming
forms that human life mostly takes. His account of friendship shows an intense focus on
moral perfection – on our unattained but attainable self, alone and with others –; but an
equally intense awareness of what he calls “the plaint of tragedy” that sounds throughout
our lives “in regard to persons, to friendship and love.”
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NOTES
1. Emerson uses the term in “Culture” (CW 6: 72, where it is written “mastertones”), but I am
following Cavell’s adaptation of the term in understanding it name main themes of his work. See
Stanley Cavell (2004), “Finding as Founding: Taking Steps in Emerson’s ‘Experience’,” in Emerson’s
Transcendental Etudes, Stanford University Press, 117.
2. “The Colors of the Spirit: Emerson and Thoreau on Nature and the Self,” “Emerson’s Mystical
Empiricism,” “Paths of Coherence Through Emerson’s Philosophy: A Reading of ‘Nominalist and
Realist’.”
3. Textual  references  are  to  The  Collected  Works  of  Ralph  Waldo  Emerson (1971-),  Cambridge,
Harvard University Press.
4. Cavell, “Thinking of Emerson,” in Stanley Cavell, Emerson’s Transcendental Etudes.
5. Cavell (1979), The Claim of Reason, Oxford University Press, 440.
6. In Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, reciprocity is a necessary condition for friendship.
7. This  blend of  the  daily  and the inventive  matches  up nicely  with Cavell’s  descriptions  of
“remarriage comedy” in Pursuits of Happiness, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
8. Cf. Emerson’s statement that “virtue is Height” (CW2: 40).
9. Portable  Nietzsche,  168-9.  Nietzsche  reread  Emerson’s  essays  during  the  summer  before  he
composed Thus Spoke Zarathustra. See Walter Kaufmann’s introduction to The Gay Science, and my
“Moral Perfectionism and Democracy in Emerson and Nietzsche,” ESQ: A Journal of the American
Renaissance, vol. 43, vols. 1-4, 1997, 159-80.
10. Ludwig Wittgenstein (1963), Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul,
paragraph 6.43.
11. William James (1983), The Principles of Psychology, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 280-2.
ABSTRACTS
Recent conversations with friends and students about Emerson’s essay on friendship lead me to
suspect that at least some of you will find Emerson’s views so strange or radical as not to be
about friendship at all.  Others will  be struck by his anticipations of Nietzsche, whose name I
introduce here because like Nietzsche,  who read him carefully,  Emerson is a genealogist and
refashioner of morals. When Emerson criticizes our normal friendships by writing that we mostly
“descend to meet,” he is recording the possibility, indeed with the word “mostly,” the actuality,
of something better than what normally passes for friendship. If Emerson finds our friendships
disappointing, that is because he thinks that friendship is a high, demanding virtue. In its best
actualizations, it carries “the world for me,” as he puts it, “to new and noble depths, and enlarge
[s] the meaning of all  my thoughts.” It has the capacity to break down the barriers between
people,  canceling  “the  thick  walls  of  individual  character,  relation,  age,  sex,  circumstance.”
Friendship is thus a great unifier, a servant of what Emerson calls the “Over-Soul” or “Unity”
Emerson and Skepticism
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, II-2 | 2010
11
(CW 2:115). But, as Emerson says in his essay on “Montaigne: or the Skeptic,” “there are doubts.”
These doubts about friendships are my main subject in the following essay.
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